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1 Introduction
The concept of stochastic stability was introduced in game theory in a series of sem-
inal papers by Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993), and
Ellison (1993). A large number of applications have since been developed, a series of
theoretical improvements have ensued, and several striking results have been proven
relying on this concept. Among the best known results, we single out three which have
had a lasting impact in the literature. First, the selection of risk-dominant equilibria
(even in the presence of alternative, Pareto-efficient ones) in coordination games un-
der best-reply or imitation dynamics (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Kandori and
Rob, 1995; Sandholm, 1998). Second, the selection of potential maximizers in exact
potential games in logit-response dynamics (Blume, 1993, 1997). Third, the selec-
tion of Walrasian equilibria in oligopolies with imitating firms (Vega-Redondo, 1997),
which has been shown to generalize to the class of aggregative games (Alo´s-Ferrer and
Ania, 2005). These are all important insights which have shaped our understanding of
equilibrium (and non-equilibrium) selection and stability.
The literature has also made a number of weaknesses apparent, some of which have
the status of unwritten “folk wisdom”. The main weakness of the stochastic stability
literature as a whole is probably the fact that many results might depend, or might be
perceived to depend on modeling details, thereby casting doubt on the main insights
gained from this approach. A number of failed robustness checks have demonstrated
this issue. We would like to argue that, while some of these checks are substantial and
have further sharpened our intuition, others have in fact arisen due to a fundamental
lack of robustness in the very concept of stochastic stability.
Among the substantial results we count the analysis in Robson and Vega-Redondo
(1996), which showed that the selection of risk-dominant equilibria under the imitation
dynamics of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) depends on the postulated interaction
structure, with round-robin interaction leading to risk-dominant equilibria but true
random matching favoring Pareto-efficient ones (this distinction would not exist if
myopic best-reply is assumed). In our opinion, this result does not correspond to a
weakness in the general approach. On the contrary, it is a substantial contribution
that points at the importance of the interaction structure, and it should not be consid-
ered a robustness check. Indeed, the importance of both the interaction structure and
the behavioral rule for equilibrium selection has been made apparent in the closely
related literature on games in networks (see Weidenholzer, 2010 for a review). For
instance, Morris (2000) shows that best-reply dynamics lead to risk-dominant equilib-
ria in quite general networks, while Alo´s-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) show that
imitation favors Pareto-efficient outcomes under comparatively mild conditions on the
network.
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Among the worrying failed robustness tests we count the fact that changing the
specification of either revision opportunities or tie-breaking assumptions might some-
times influence the long-run outcomes in a given dynamics. This affects, for instance,
the well-known result that the original logit dynamics of Blume (1993, 1997) selects
potential maximizers in exact potential games. Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) have
shown that this result depends crucially on the assumption of asynchronous learning,
that is, a dynamic specification in which every period one and only one agent is se-
lected and allowed to revise his or her strategy, while all other players are required to
stay put. The result vanishes if more general revision processes are allowed for.
Tie-breaking assumptions are also not always harmless. Suppose that a behavioral
rule fully specifies the set of strategies that a player might choose from, e.g. the set of
payoff maximizers given other players’ strategies (as in the case of myopic best-reply)
or the set of strategies leading to currently maximal, observed payoffs (as in the case of
imitation). Even abstracting from revision opportunities, this still does not fully spec-
ify the dynamics. One might for instance require that all optimal strategies be chosen
with positive (maybe equal) probability; it might, however, be equally reasonable to
postulate that players who are already employing one of the optimal strategies do not
switch away. These are all reasonable choices, which sometimes have consequences
for the dynamic analysis (contrast e.g. Oechssler, 1997 and Alo´s-Ferrer, 2003; see also
Sandholm, 1998).
The possible dependence of long-run predictions on the specification of revision
opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions is an important consideration. A result
which depends on such modeling details, which can be argued to be orthogonal to the
behavioral rule and the interaction structure, should not be considered to be on equal
grounds with a result which is immune to the specification thereof. In the present
research, we aim to provide and apply a simple result which helps establish when
a long-run prediction is robust to the specification of revision opportunities and/or
tie-breaking assumptions.
We concentrate on these modeling specification issues because they are the ones
which “should not matter”, and hence robustness failures are particularly worrying.
The issue of robustness, however, is more general. One of the early criticisms on the
literature, due to Bergin and Lipman (1996), was that results might change if the per-
turbations (mistakes or mutations) which are used to define stochastic stability can be
defined in a state-dependent way. By specifying arbitrary asymmetric perturbations
it is possible to stabilize any outcome. The question is then rather whether results
are robust to the specification of perturbations within a reasonable class. An excellent
example of such a robustness analysis is van Damme and Weibull (2002), which showed
the robustness of the results of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) if mutation rates are
endogenously determined, assuming that players can effortfully control the probability
of implementing their intended strategies. Further, for specific dynamics, additional
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dimensions not considered here might be natural candidates for a robustness analysis.
Consider the case of imitation with memory (e.g. Alo´s-Ferrer, 2004, 2008; Bergin and
Bernhardt, 2009; Alo´s-Ferrer and Shi, 2012). A nice example of robustness analysis
within this category is Josephson and Matros (2004) which considers imitation dynam-
ics for multiple populations analogous to Young (1993) and derives selection results
which are robust to the specification of memory length and information sample size.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general framework for
the analysis. Section 3 introduces the robustness concept and presents the main result.
Section 4 analyzes symmetric binary-action games both for the logit-response dynamics
and for the popular best-reply mistakes model. Section 5 investigates evolutionary
stability and aggregate-taking behavior for perturbed imitation dynamics. Section 6
concludes.
2 Learning in Games: A General Framework
2.1 Stage Model
Consider a finite population of N agents who repeatedly interact in discrete time
t = 1, 2, . . . according to a pre-specified stage model, formalized as a finite, normal-
form game Γ = (I, (Si, ui)i∈I), where I = {1, 2, ..., N} is the set of players, Si are
the pure strategy sets, and ui : S → R are payoff functions, where S =
∏
i∈I Si. We
let S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj be the set of strategy profiles of all players except i, and write
s = (si, s−i) and ui(si, s−i). The strategies chosen and the stage model determine
the payoffs agents receive at the end of the period t. The stage model can simply be
taken to be an arbitrary, asymmetric N -player game, as in Blume (1993) or Alo´s-Ferrer
and Netzer (2010), or it can incorporate additional structure. For example, it might
specify that agents play a bilateral finite game sequentially against each other agent
in the population (round robin tournament), as in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)
(hereafter KMR), where the bilateral game is a symmetric 2× 2 coordination game.
2.2 Behavioral Rules and Correspondences, and Tie-Breaking
The game is played by boundedly rational players whose behavior is summarized by
behavioral rules. At the beginning of each period, a certain subset of agents is chosen
to update their actions. Each of them then chooses a pure strategy according to a
pre-specified behavioral rule Bi : S 7→ ∆Si. That is, Bi(s)(s
′
i) is the probability with
which player i will choose strategy s′i ∈ Si after the profile s ∈ S has been played. A
simple behavioral rule which has been extensively studied in the literature of learning
in games is the myopic best-reply rule, where players are assumed to be able to compute
best-replies to the current profile of strategies of their opponents, and choose one of
them. In games with alternative best-replies, the need for tie-breaking gives rise to a
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family of rules. That is, a rule BBRi is a best-reply rule if
BBRi (s)(s
′
i) > 0 =⇒ ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(s
′′
i , s−i) ∀ s
′′
i ∈ Si. (1)
Let us call Γ a symmetric game if Si = Sj = S0 for all i, j ∈ I and payoffs are given by a
symmetric mapping, i.e., the payoff of a player choosing strategy si against the profile
of strategies s−i is ui(si, s−i) = u(si|s−i), where the latter is invariant to permutations
of s−i. For symmetric games, a second prominent example of behavioral rule (or,
rather, family thereof) is given by imitate-the-best rules as in KMR, Vega-Redondo
(1997), or Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania (2005), where players just adopt one of the strategies
leading to the highest, currently observed payoff. That is, again taking into account
the need for tie-breaking assumptions, a rule BIBi is an imitate-the-best rule if
BIBi (s)(s
′
i) > 0 =⇒
s′i = sj for some j ∈ I with
uj(s) ≥ uk(s) ∀ k ∈ I.
(2)
The description of both the best-reply and the imitation rules allows for different
tie-breaking assumptions. We will now provide a formal approach to their specifica-
tion.1 A behavioral correspondence for player i is a correspondence B̂i : S ։ Si. That
is, B̂i(s) is the set of strategies s
′
i ∈ Si which player i might choose after the profile
s ∈ S has been played.2 A behavioral rule Bi is said to agree with correspondence B̂i
if
Bi(s)(s
′
i) > 0 =⇒ s
′
i ∈ B̂i(s) (3)
for all s′i ∈ Si and all s ∈ S. For instance, myopic best-reply rules as in (1) are those
agreeing with the best-reply correspondence
B̂BRi (s) = {s
′
i ∈ Si | ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(s
′′
i , s−i) ∀s
′′
i ∈ Si}.
Imitate-the-best rules as in (2) are those agreeing with the imitate-the-best correspon-
dence
B̂IBi (s) = {s
′
i ∈ Si | s
′
i = sj for some j ∈ I with uj(s) ≥ uk(s) ∀k ∈ I}.
Given a behavioral correspondence B̂i, we say that a behavioral rule Bi agreeing with
1Note that a rule’s definition might formally rely on the payoff functions, but the interpretation of
the actual knowledge of the game that players have might be very different. Under best-reply, players
do know the payoff function and can use it to (myopically) optimize their behavior. For imitation
rules, the use of the payoff function is just a modeling device capturing the informational assumption
that players observe realized payoffs, but do not necessarily know the game or are able to perform
optimizing computations.
2Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) introduce the term behavior correspondence in a different context.
Apart from technical issues (as e.g. whether they are defined on profiles of pure or mixed strategies),
the main difference is that we do not require behavioral correspondences to be extensions of the
best-reply correspondence.
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B̂i is balanced if Bi(s)(si) > 0 whenever si ∈ B̂i(s), where si is player i’s strategy
in the profile s, and Bi(s)(s
′
i) > 0 for all s
′
i ∈ B̂i(s) whenever si /∈ B̂i(s). With a
balanced behavioral rule, players who find their current behavior optimal according to
the behavioral correspondence will not abandon it for sure (although they might also
not stick to it for sure). If the current behavior is not optimal, then balanced rules
respect anonymity of the strategies in the sense that they place positive (although not
necessarily identical) probability on all optimal strategies.3 Let Ti denote the set of
all balanced behavioral rules that agree with a given correspondence B̂i. (We suppress
dependency of Ti on B̂i for notational convenience.)
Now consider two balanced behavioral rules Bi and B
′
i from Ti. We say that B
′
i is
(weakly) swifter than Bi, written Bi  B
′
i, if Bi(s)(s
′
i) > 0 implies B
′
i(s)(s
′
i) > 0, for
all s′i ∈ Si and all s ∈ S. That is, the support of B
′
i is always weakly larger than the
support of Bi. We say that the two rules are equally swift, written Bi ≃ B
′
i, if Bi  B
′
i
and B′i  Bi, so that the sets {s
′
i ∈ Si | Bi(s)(s
′
i) > 0} and {s
′
i ∈ Si | B
′
i(s)(s
′
i) > 0}
always coincide. By construction, the relation ≃ is a binary equivalence relation on
Ti. In the following, we will informally identify two behavioral rules if they are equally
swift, i.e., if they differ in specific probabilities assigned to strategies, but not in their
support. Formally, we work in the quotient set Ti/ ≃, on which the swiftness relation
 becomes a partial order.
Among all rules in Ti, we consider two distinguished rules (modulo equal swift-
ness). The cautious tie-breaking rule B0i is the balanced rule specifying B
0
i (s)(si) = 1
whenever si ∈ B̂i(s). That is, under the cautious rule a player always sticks to his or
her current action if it is one of the optimal ones according to the behavioral corre-
spondence B̂i. The random tie-breaking rule B
X
i is the rule given by B
X
i (s)(s
′
i) > 0
for all s′i ∈ B̂i(s), that is, all strategies that are optimal according to B̂i are always
chosen with strictly positive probability. The following observation is now immediate.
Lemma 1. Any balanced behavioral rule Bi satisfies B
0
i  Bi  B
X
i .
That is, the poset Ti/ ≃ has a top and a bottom element. It is straightforward to
show that it is actually a complete lattice. We denote profiles of balanced behavioral
rules for all players by B = (Bi)i∈I ∈ T :=
∏
i∈I Ti. Consider the product order on
T , i.e., B  B′ if and only if B′i is weakly swifter than Bi for all i ∈ I. Then we
also obtain B0  B  BX for any balanced profile B and the two extreme profiles
B0 = (B0i )i∈I and B
X = (BXi )i∈I .
3Lexicographic tie-breaking conditions as e.g. choosing the most popular action in case of ties would
violate balancedness. They could, however, also be built into the behavioral correspondence, and the
modified rules would then be balanced by virtue of a “tie” meaning then both equal payoffs and
identical popularity.
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2.3 Revision Opportunities
A learning dynamics for a game Γ is made of a behavioral rule for each player, which
includes tie-breaking assumptions, and a specification of revision opportunities, i.e.,
a way of determining which players receive the opportunity to update their actions
in a given period. Intuitively, revision opportunities are closely related to the speed
of the dynamics. A dynamics where only one agent is allowed to revise per period is
more gradual than one where the whole population might switch away simultaneously,
enabling abrupt transition phenomena. Following Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), a
revision process is a probability measure q on the set of all subsets of I, with the
property that
∀ i ∈ I, ∃J ⊆ I such that i ∈ J and q(J) > 0, (4)
where q(J) (also written qJ) is interpreted as the probability that exactly the players in
J receive a revision opportunity (independently across periods). Condition (4) implies
that each player gets the opportunity to revise with strictly positive probability. A
revision process is called regular if qi = q{i} > 0 for all i ∈ I, so that for each player
there is a strictly positive probability of being the only player who is allowed to revise.
Let Q denote the set of all regular revision processes.
Analogously to the previous subsection, we can define a binary relation  on Q as
follows.4 For any q, q′ ∈ Q we say that q′ is (weakly) quicker than q, written q  q′,
if qJ > 0 implies q
′
J > 0, for all J ⊆ I. That is, the revision process q
′ includes more
possibilities than q. We say that q and q′ have the same speed, written q ≃ q′, if q  q′
and q′  q. By construction, the relation ≃ is a binary equivalence relation. Consider
again the quotient set Q/ ≃, where two revision processes belong to the same class if
and only if they have the same speed, i.e., they differ in specific probabilities assigned
to player subsets but not in their support. We will again identify two processes that
have the same speed and treat  as a partial order.
Among all processes in Q, we again consider two distinguished elements (modulo
equal speed). The asynchronous learning process qAL satisfies qALJ = 0 whenever
|J | ≥ 2. The independent learning process qIL satisfies qILJ > 0 for all J ⊆ I.
5 The
following observation is now again immediate.
Lemma 2. Any regular revision process q satisfies qAL  q  qIL.
Therefore the poset Q/ ≃ has a top and a bottom element as well. It is again a
simple exercise to show that it is actually a complete lattice.
4We use the same symbol for the binary relations on T and on Q for convenience.
5These concepts are again taken from Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). The model of Blume (1993)
postulates qi = 1/N and is therefore an instance of asynchronous learning. Independent inertia as
in Sandholm (1998), where qJ = p
|J| (1− p)N−|J| for some 0 < p < 1, is an instance of independent
learning. The simultaneous learning process, where qI = 1, is the simplest example of a process which
is not regular.
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2.4 Stochastic Stability
Given a profile of behavioral rules B and a revision process q, the unperturbed dynamics
(B, q) induces a Markov chain on the state space S. An absorbing set of (B, q) is a
minimal set of states with respect to the property that it cannot be left with positive
probability under (B, q). An absorbing state is a state s ∈ S such that the singleton
set {s} is absorbing. The fact that unperturbed learning dynamics will typically have
multiple absorbing sets or states motivates the introduction of noise to select between
them.
We can apply a noise process to B to derive associated profiles of behavioral rules
with noise Bε = (Bεi )i∈I , where ε ∈ (0, 1) measures how strongly the players’ behavior
is perturbed from B.6 For the first noise process that we consider, the mistakes model,
we fix a noise rule Ei : S 7→ ∆Si for every player i ∈ I, where Ei(s)(s
′
i) is independent
of s and satisfies Ei(s)(s
′
i) > 0 for all s
′
i ∈ Si. Then each player’s behavioral rule Bi is
perturbed to BM,εi by
BM,εi (s)(s
′
i) = (1− ε)Bi(s)(s
′
i) + εEi(s)(s
′
i). (5)
For instance, the best-reply version of the well-known KMRmodel, first studied in Kan-
dori and Rob (1995), proceeds exactly like this to derive the best-reply with mistakes
BBR,M,εi from an unperturbed best-reply rule B
BR
i . As ε → 0, behavior converges to
the best-reply rule. The noisy version BIB,M,εi of an imitate-the-best rule B
IB
i can be
constructed analogously.7 Importantly, the tie-breaking assumptions implicit in BBRi
or BIBi carry over to the noisy rules when the mistakes approach is used. When we
start from a behavioral correspondence such as B̂BRi or B̂
IB
i , for instance, the mistakes
model associates to every behavioral rule Bi ∈ Ti a distinct behavioral rule with noise
Bεi , which converges to Bi as ε → 0. We say that noise processes with this property
respect tie-breaking. The second noise process that we will consider is the logit choice
function, which has been used in the literature to obtain noisy versions of the best-
reply dynamics (see e.g. Blume, 1993 or Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010). Formally, the
probability of player i choosing s′i is given by
BBR,L,εi (s)(s
′
i) =
e(1/ε)ui(s
′
i,s−i)∑
s′′i ∈Si
e(1/ε)ui(s
′′
i ,s−i)
. (6)
Again, all actions are chosen with strictly positive probability whenever ε > 0 and
choice concentrates on myopic best-replies as ε→ 0. The logit perturbation, however,
leaves no freedom in tie-breaking assumptions. As ε→ 0, the behavioral rule BBR,L,εi
6See Bergin and Lipman (1996) for a general treatment of noise processes.
7The original KMR model can be readily interpreted as a model of imitation (see KMR p. 31,
Rhode and Stegeman, 1996, and Sandholm, 1998) where agents mimic the actions which led to the
highest payoffs in the last period.
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converges to the specific best-reply rule that breaks ties with equal probabilities. The
logit approach is therefore not suited to associate a distinct noisy rule to every Bi ∈ Ti
for a given behavioral correspondence B̂i. By using logit choice, we rather select
a specific Bi ∈ Ti, the one with equal tie-breaking.
8 We say that noise processes
with this property impose tie-breaking. Other particular examples of noise processes
could also be considered. For instance, Myatt and Wallace (2003) and Dokumaci
and Sandholm (2008) consider dynamics based on probit choice functions, which, as
in the case of logit, impose tie-breaking. Sandholm (2010) considers general “noisy
revision protocols” (where the word revision is used in a different sense than in this
paper) including the mistakes model and logit and probit choice. The two prominent
examples presented above are those for which we develop specific applications later.
Now consider any perturbed dynamics (Bε, q) derived from an unperturbed dy-
namics (B, q) according to some noise process. Suppose that all Bεi have full support
whenever 0 < ε < 1, as in the examples above. Then, the perturbed dynamics in-
duces an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain on the state space S with transition
probabilities
P εs,s′ =
∑
J⊆I|sk=s
′
k
∀k∈I\J
qJ
∏
i∈J
Bεi (s)(s
′
i), (7)
and it has a unique invariant distribution, denoted µε. A strategy profile or state
s ∈ S is stochastically stable for (Bǫ, q) if limε→0 µ
ε(s) > 0. Stochastic stability for
the mistakes model can be characterized along the lines introduced in KMR or Young
(1993), with a useful “radius-coradius” sufficient condition developed by Ellison (2000).
Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) provide an analogous general characterization for the
logit-response dynamics, and a similar radius-coradius result.9
3 Robustness
3.1 Definitions
We are interested in the following two concepts of robustness. First, suppose we
consider a given profile of behavioral rules with noise Bε, based on some underlying
profile of unperturbed behavioral rules B. Hence we treat as fixed a specification of
tie-breaking assumptions. This is always the case when the noise process imposes tie-
breaking, as with the logit-response dynamics, but it can be done for any behavioral
rule and noise process as detailed above. Robustness now refers to the specification of
revision opportunities alone.
8One could also study the logit perturbation BIB,L,εi of an imitate-the-best dynamics B
IB
i , which
would converge to the equal tie-breaking imitation rule as noise vanishes.
9Several earlier contributions have studied logit behavior for special classes of games or dynamics
(e.g. Blume, 1993, 1997; Maruta, 2002; Myatt and Wallace, 2008a,b). See Beggs (2005) for radius-
coradius results with a focus on waiting times.
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Definition 1. Fix a profile of behavioral rules with noise Bε. A state s ∈ S is robustly
stochastically stable with respect to revision processes (RSS-R) if it is stochastically
stable for (Bε, q) for any regular revision process q ∈ Q.
Second, suppose we consider a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ = (B̂i)i∈I ,
with T being the set of profiles of balanced behavioral rules that agree player-wise
with B̂. For each B ∈ T we then apply a noise process that respects tie-breaking to
associate a profile with noise Bε. Robustness then refers to the specification of both
tie-breaking assumptions and revision opportunities.
Definition 2. Fix a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ and a noise process that
respects tie-breaking. A state s ∈ S is robustly stochastically stable with respect to
revision processes and tie-breaking (RSS-RT) if it is stochastically stable for (Bε, q) for
any q ∈ Q and any Bε that the noise process associates to some element of T .
We aim to provide a method allowing us to identify RSS-R and RSS-RT states
based on the concepts of radius and coradius. We first introduce the following auxiliary
concept.
Definition 3. An operator on revision processes is a mapping
T : Q × S 7→ R
(q, s) 7→ T q(s).
Given some s ∈ S, the operator T is monotone for s if T q(s) ≥ T q
′
(s) whenever q  q′.
It is monotone if it is monotone for all s ∈ S.
In contrast to the usual approach, we will not define radius and coradius from a
primitive such as cost (Ellison, 2000) or waste (Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010). The only
property of the different radius and coradius concepts that we need in the following is
that they are monotone operators (for the candidate prediction) that yield sufficient
conditions for stochastic stability.
Definition 4. Fix a profile of behavioral rules with noise Bε. A radius-coradius
pair (R,CR) for Bε is a pair of operators on revision processes such that, whenever
Rq(s) > CRq(s) for some absorbing state s ∈ S of the unperturbed dynamics (B, q),
it follows that s is the unique stochastically stable state for (Bε, q). Given some s ∈ S,
a radius-coradius pair is monotone for s if both operators are monotone for s.
As we will show below, the existing radius and coradius concepts of Ellison (2000)
and Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) are monotone operators under minimal conditions.
Once monotonicity is established, the fact that the property embodied in the definition
above is fulfilled follows from the radius-coradius theorems in Ellison (2000) and Alo´s-
Ferrer and Netzer (2010).
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Analogously, we can define (monotone) operators and radius-coradius pairs with
respect to both revision opportunities and tie-breaking rules as follows. Fix a profile
of behavioral correspondences B̂, which induces the set T , and consider the product
order on T ×Q, i.e., (B, q)  (B′, q′) if and only if B  B′ and q  q′.
Definition 5. An operator on revision processes and tie-breaking rules is a mapping
T : T ×Q × S 7→ R
(B, q, s) 7→ TB,q(s).
Given some s ∈ S, the operator T is monotone for s if TB,q(s) ≥ TB
′,q′(s) whenever
(B, q)  (B′, q′). It is monotone if it is monotone for all s ∈ S.
Definition 6. Fix a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ and a noise process that
respects tie-breaking. A radius-coradius pair (R,CR) for B̂ and the noise process is
a pair of operators on revision processes and tie-breaking rules such that, whenever
RB,q(s) > CRB,q(s) for some absorbing state s ∈ S of the unperturbed dynamics
(B, q), it follows that s is the unique stochastically stable state for (Bǫ, q). Given some
s ∈ S, a radius-coradius pair is monotone for s if both operators are monotone for s.
3.2 Results
The following proposition embodies the main idea behind our results.
Proposition 1. (i) Fix a profile of behavioral rules with noise Bε. Let (R,CR) be a
radius-coradius pair for Bε. Let q1, q2 ∈ Q with q1  q2. If there exists an absorbing
state s ∈ S of (B, q2) such that (R,CR) is monotone for s and
Rq
2
(s) > CRq
1
(s),
then s is the unique stochastically stable state for any (Bǫ, q) with q1  q  q2.
(ii) Fix a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ and a noise process that respects
tie-breaking. Let (R,CR) be a radius-coradius pair for B̂ and the noise process. Let
(B1, q1), (B2, q2) ∈ T ×Q with (B1, q1)  (B2, q2). If there exists an absorbing state
s ∈ S of (B2, q2) such that (R,CR) is monotone for s and
RB
2,q2(s) > CRB
1,q1(s),
then s is the unique stochastically stable state for any (Bǫ, q) with (B1, q1)  (B, q) 
(B2, q2).
Proof. We prove statement (ii). Statement (i) is proven analogously. Consider an
arbitrary (B, q) ∈ T ×Q with (B1, q1)  (B, q)  (B2, q2). Since s is an absorbing
state of (B2, q2), it is also an absorbing state of (B, q), because the latter (unperturbed)
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dynamics enables fewer positive-probability transitions than (B2, q2). It then suffices
to notice that, by monotonicity,
RB,q(s) ≥ RB
2,q2(s) > CRB
1,q1(s) ≥ CRB,q(s),
which implies the statement by definition of radius-coradius pair.
Using part (i) of this result and Lemma 2, we obtain an immediate corollary which
delivers a simple condition for RSS-R.
Corollary 1. Fix a profile of behavioral rules with noise Bε. Let (R,CR) be a radius-
coradius pair for Bε. If there exists an absorbing state s ∈ S of (B, qIL) such that
(R,CR) is monotone for s and
Rq
IL
(s) > CRq
AL
(s),
then s is the unique RSS-R state.
This corollary applies directly to the logit-response dynamics or to any mistakes
model for pre-specified tie-breaking assumptions. The result states that establishing
robust stochastic stability is just as simple (or just as complex) as establishing stochas-
tic stability with the help of a radius-coradius result. The only difference is that one
must focus on asynchronous learning for computing the coradius and on independent
learning for computing the radius.
Using part (ii) of Proposition 1 and Lemmata 1 and 2, we also obtain an immediate
corollary about robustness with respect to tie-breaking rules in addition to revision
processes.
Corollary 2. Fix a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ and a noise process that
respects tie-breaking. Let (R,CR) be a radius-coradius pair for B̂ and the noise process.
If there exists an absorbing state s ∈ S of (BX , qIL) such that (R,CR) is monotone
for s and
RB
X ,qIL(s) > CRB
0,qAL(s),
then s is the unique RSS-RT state.
Hence, even when we require robustness to cover both revision processes and tie-
breaking assumptions, a radius-coradius result applies. Again we need to focus on
two different, focal dynamic specifications only: independent learning with random
tie-breaking, and asynchronous learning with cautious tie-breaking.
3.3 Applying the Results
In order to apply the results, one needs to identify a radius-coradius pair and guarantee
monotonicity. This is easy to do for the existing concepts of Ellison (2000) for the
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mistakes model and Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) for the logit-response dynamics.
The coradius of a state s due to Ellison (2000) is the maximum across states s′ 6= s
of the minimum number of mistakes required to enable a positive-probability transition
from s′ to s in the unperturbed dynamics (B, q).10 A mistake here is a strategy choice
of agent i that has zero probability under rule Bi. If an unperturbed dynamics includes
more positive-probability transitions, then the minima can only weakly decrease and
the maximum among all the minima can only be weakly smaller than before. The
reasoning for logit-response is analogous, with the number of mistakes replaced by the
utility differences between the chosen actions and the myopically optimal ones. This
shows the following.
Proposition 2. The coradius concept of Ellison (2000) is a monotone operator on
revision processes and tie-breaking rules. The coradius concept of Alo´s-Ferrer and
Netzer (2010) is a monotone operator on revision processes.
The radius of a state s due to Ellison (2000) is the minimal number of mistakes
needed to enable a positive-probability transition from s to some absorbing set not
containing s. Again, the concept for logit-response is analogous, with the number
of mistakes replaced by the appropriate utility differences. In general, the radius
will also be a monotone operator. The intuition is again that, if one considers an
unperturbed dynamics that includes more positive-probability transitions, then the
path which previously realized the radius is still feasible and associated with a weakly
smaller number of mistakes (or utility losses). Hence the minimum can only become
weakly smaller. The only problem with this argument is that the absorbing set reached
under the initial dynamics might cease to be absorbing under a dynamics enabling more
transitions. In some cases, this might create difficulties. Hence, we provide a result
delivering a sufficient condition for monotonicity. We formulate it only for the radius
of Ellison (2000). The analogous result also holds for the radius of the logit-response
dynamics (where only revision opportunities can be varied).
Proposition 3. Fix a profile of behavioral correspondences B̂ and let (B1, q1), (B2, q2) ∈
T × Q with (B1, q1)  (B2, q2). Suppose there exists an absorbing state s ∈ S of
(B2, q2) such that
(α) in every absorbing set S′ 6= {s} of (B1, q1) there exists a state s′ such that the
probability of reaching s from s′ under (B2, q2) is zero.
Then the radius concept of Ellison (2000) is a monotone operator for s on the set of
all (B, q) with (B1, q1)  (B, q)  (B2, q2).
Proof. Say that s′′ ∈ S is (B, q)-reachable from s′ ∈ S if there exists a positive-
probability path from s′ to s′′ in dynamics (B, q). Note that if (B, q)  (B′, q′) and s′′
10Radius and coradius are often defined only for (the elements of) absorbing sets. The difference is
inconsequential for our purposes.
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is (B, q)-reachable from s′, then s′′ is also (B′, q′)-reachable from s′, because the latter
dynamics allows for more positive-probability paths. As an immediate consequence, s
is an absorbing state of any dynamics (B, q) with (B, q)  (B2, q2).
Fix any (B, q), (B′, q′) ∈ T ×Q with (B1, q1)  (B, q)  (B′, q′)  (B2, q2). Let
RB,q(s) = m. We aim to prove that RB
′,q′(s) ≤ m. Consider a path for (B, q) that
realizes the radius, starting at s and reaching some s′ in an absorbing set S′ of (B, q)
with s /∈ S′. For (B′, q′), this path is still feasible and associated with a number of
mistakes weakly smaller than m. The set S′, however, is not necessarily an absorbing
set of (B′, q′). However, since states outside of S′ are not (B, q)-reachable from states
in S′, they are also not (B1, q1)-reachable from states in S′. It follows that there
exists an absorbing set S′′ of (B1, q1) with S′′ ⊆ S′ and an s′′ ∈ S′′ which is (B1, q1)-
reachable, hence (B′, q′)-reachable, from s′. By (α), there is an s′′′ ∈ S′′ such that s is
not (B2, q2)-reachable, and hence not (B′, q′)-reachable, from s′′′. Since s′′, s′′′ ∈ S′′,
which is an absorbing set of (B1, q1), s′′′ is (B1, q1)-reachable, hence (B′, q′)-reachable,
from s′′. Since s is not (B′, q′)-reachable from s′′′ (and the state space is finite) it
follows that there exists some absorbing set S∗ of (B′, q′) with s /∈ S∗ which is (B′, q′)-
reachable from s′′′. Connecting the paths from s to s′, from the latter to s′′, from the
latter to s′′′, and from the latter to S∗, we obtain a path from s to an absorbing set of
(B′, q′) not containing s, with a number of mistakes weakly smaller than m for (B′, q′).
Hence, RB
′,q′(s) ≤ m.
Condition (α) in the proposition merely captures the idea that absorbing sets
should not become fully embodied in the “basin of attraction” of s as one moves
from the less quick/swift dynamics to the quickest/swiftest one. A sufficient condi-
tion fulfilled in many applications is simply that absorbing sets do not change across
dynamics.
Remark 1. Monotonicity of the radius and coradius operators, either in general or
just for the appropriate state, is of course just a sufficient condition for our results
to hold. One could replace them by even weaker conditions. For instance, as can
be seen from its proof, Proposition 1 also holds if we replace the requirement that
the radius be a monotone operator by the condition that the radius of s under the
upper bound dynamics should be weakly smaller than the radius of s under any of
the other dynamics. For Corollary 1, this translates into Rq(s) ≥ Rq
IL
(s) for all q
with qAL  q  qIL. For Corollary 2, the condition becomes RB,q(s) ≥ RB
X ,qIL(s)
for all (B, q) with (B0, qAL)  (B, q)  (BX , qIL). These weaker conditions are harder
to verify in general. As we will see, however, for some particular cases they are still
applicable.
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4 Symmetric Binary Action Games
4.1 Notation and Definitions
Let Γ be a symmetric binary action game (see e.g. Kim, 1996; Maruta, 2002; Blume,
2003) with strategy set S0 = {A,B}. Symmetry implies that each player’s payoff
depends only on the own action and on the number of opponents choosing each action.11
Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, denote by m(s) the number of players choosing A in
s. Let piA(n) be the payoff of an A-player if n players choose action A (including
the respective player herself) and let piB(n) be the payoff of a B-player if n players
choose A. We can then write the payoff functions as ui(si, s−i) = pi
si(m(si, s−i)).
Furthermore, we define ∆(n) = piA(n)−piB(n− 1) for 1 ≤ n ≤ N as the payoff change
of a player who switches from action B to action A, given that n− 1 of the opponents
choose action A so that the overall number of A-players is n after the switch. We
consider two examples.
Example 1. Consider a unanimity game (e.g. Young, 1998a, Section 9) where piB(0) > 0
and piA(N) > 0, but piA(n) = 0 if n < N and piB(n) = 0 if n > 0. The game has
two strict Nash equilibria, A = (A, . . . , A) and B = (B, . . . , B). In addition, every
profile s ∈ S with 2 ≤ m(s) ≤ N − 2 is a non-strict Nash equilibrium. The difference
function ∆(n) of the unanimity game is given by ∆(1) = −piB(0), ∆(n) = 0 for all
2 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and ∆(N) = piA(N).
Example 2. The unanimity game can be generalized in different ways. As a particularly
interesting example for our purpose, consider a team project game with two projects,
A and B, where each of the N players must participate in exactly one of the projects.
Participation is costless, but the success of project A requires the participation of at
least 1 ≤ nA ≤ N players, while project B is successful if at least 1 ≤ nB ≤ N
players participate. Assume further that nA+nB > N +1, which implies that the two
projects cannot be realized jointly and that there is the possibility that none of them
is successful. If project A (B) is successful, it generates an overall benefit of size a > 0
(b > 0), which is distributed equally among all participating players. Players who do
not participate in a successful project obtain a payoff of zero. Hence payoffs are
piA(n) =
{
a/n if n ≥ nA,
0 if n < nA,
piB(n) =
{
0 if n > N − nB,
b/(N − n) if n ≤ N − nB.
The two monomorphic profiles A and B are again strict Nash equilibria, and profiles
s ∈ S with N −nB +2 ≤ m(s) ≤ nA− 2 are non-strict Nash equilibria. We obtain the
11Sandholm (2010) also considers symmetric binary action games, concentrating on the asymptotics
as noise vanishes and population size goes to infinity. Staudigl (2012) follows the same approach for
asymmetric binary action games.
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difference function
∆(n) =

a/n if nA ≤ n ≤ N,
0 if N − nB + 2 ≤ n ≤ nA − 1,
−b/(N − n+ 1) if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − nB + 1.
The team project game becomes the unanimity game if nA = nB = N .
12
As shown by Hofbauer and Sorger (2002, p. 27), every symmetric binary action
game is an exact potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996). It is
straightforward to verify that
ρ(s) =

m(s)∑
j=1
∆(j) if m(s) ≥ 1,
0 if m(s) = 0.
(8)
is a potential function for these games.13 Potential games are relevant for the logit-
response dynamics, which, as mentioned in the introduction, selects the potential-
maximizing states as stochastically stable under certain assumptions.
We now introduce two additional properties that are crucial for robust stochastic
stability, supermodularity and strategic complementarity (Topkis, 1998; Vives, 2005).
For symmetric binary action games, the usual definition of supermodularity based on
increasing differences of the payoff function is equivalent to the requirement that the
difference function ∆(n) is weakly increasing in n.14 Figure 1 depicts an exemplary
difference function of a supermodular game. The unanimity game is supermodular.
Another example would be a population game where N players are matched pairwise
in a round-robin tournament to play a symmetric 2× 2 coordination game.
The team project game is not supermodular (except if nA = nB = N) because ∆(n)
is decreasing from 1 to N − nB + 1 and from nA to N . Still, the game has monotonic
best-responses and hence satisfies the weaker condition of strategic complementarity.
For symmetric binary action games, strategic complementarity is equivalent to the
existence of two values n and n with the property that ∆(n) < 0 if and only if
n ≤ n and ∆(n) > 0 if and only if n > n. Thus any supermodular game exhibits
12Maruta (2002) and Maruta and Okada (2009) generalize unanimity games to the different class
of “binary coordination games” (see our discussion below). Our team project game is also related
to the collective-action games studied by Myatt and Wallace (2008a,b) for general quantal response
dynamics under asynchronous learning (and also simultaneous learning in Myatt and Wallace, 2008b).
The games in Myatt and Wallace (2008a,b) are not necessarily symmetric, they exhibit a single project
only, and all players obtain a positive payoff if the project is successful.
13Maruta (2002) shows that symmetric binary coordination games are exact potential games, with a
potential function as given in (8). Myatt and Wallace (2008b) show that their collective-action games
are potential games under a symmetry condition, again with a potential function similar to (8).
14Such games are called binary coordination games by Maruta (2002) and Maruta and Okada
(2009). Technically speaking, Maruta (2002) requires the difference function ∆ to be strictly in-
creasing. Maruta and Okada (2009) allow for games that are not necessarily symmetric.
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Figure 1: Supermodularity
strategic complementarity but the converse is not true. Figure 2 illustrates the case of
a game that exhibits strategic complementarity but is not supermodular. We assume
throughout that n > 0 and n < N , to render the problem of equilibrium selection
meaningful. If Γ exhibits strategic complementarity, only A or B can maximize the
potential function ρ given in (8), which adds the values ∆(n) up to m(s) for any s.
Figure 2: Strategic Complementarity
4.2 Logit-Response
We first study the logit-response dynamics based on myopic best-response. An earlier
result by Blume (1993, 1997) for the class of exact potential games implies that the
potential maximizing strategy profile will be stochastically stable under asynchronous
learning. With the potential function (8), the difference in potential between two states
s and s′ corresponds to the accumulated utility changes of moving asynchronously from
s to s′. Moving towards a profile with larger potential is thus always easier under logit
response if only one player can update at a time. Consider the unanimity game, for
instance. We only need to compare the value of the potential between A and B.
Straightforward calculations reveal that ρ(B) = 0 and ρ(A) = (a − b)/N , so that
a project is stochastically stable with asynchronous logit-response if and only if it is
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Pareto efficient. We now want to examine under which conditions the selection of the
potential maximizers by the logit-response dynamics is robust with respect to revision
processes.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a supermodular symmetric binary action game. Consider the
logit-response dynamics. Then, the potential maximizers are RSS-R.
Proof. Let Γ be a supermodular symmetric binary action game, with critical values
n > 0 and n < N as defined above. We will rely on Corollary 1 and the radius-coradius
from Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). The coradius is always monotone, by Proposition
2. For any process q ∈ Q, the unperturbed myopic best-reply dynamics with random
(equal probability) tie-breaking has two absorbing sets, the singletons {A} and {B}.
Hence the radius is also monotone for both absorbing states, by Proposition 3.
Consider asynchronous learning. The waste caused by a single player switching
from B to A in the presence of n − 1 other A-players is max{−∆(n), 0} and hence
non-zero if and only if n ≤ n. Analogously, the waste that is generated if one of n
A-players switches to B is max{∆(n), 0} and non-zero if and only if n > n. Fix any
s′ 6= B. Construct a minimal waste path P = (s′, ...,B) by letting A-players switch to
B sequentially. We obtain the waste
W (P ) =
m(s′)∑
j=1
max{∆(j), 0}.
It is maximal if s′ = A so that m(s′) = N , which yields
CRq
AL
(B) =
N∑
j=1
max{∆(j), 0} =
N∑
j=n+1
∆(j),
and, from analogous arguments,
CRq
AL
(A) =
N∑
j=1
max{−∆(j), 0} = −
n∑
j=1
∆(j).
Consider independent learning. Since ∆(n) is increasing in n by supermodularity,
the waste caused by a B-player switching to A in the presence of n − 1 A-players,
max{−∆(n), 0}, is decreasing in n. Analogously, the waste of an A-player switching to
B, max{∆(n), 0}, is increasing in n. Hence the waste caused by several players switch-
ing simultaneously is weakly larger than the waste caused by sequential switching, so
that among minimal waste paths between A and B there are always paths that make
use of sequential revisions only. This implies
Rq
IL
(B) = −
n∑
j=1
∆(j), Rq
IL
(A) =
N∑
j=n+1
∆(j).
18
Now suppose B is the unique potential maximizer, i.e.,
∑N
j=1∆(j) < 0. This can
be rearranged to
−
n∑
j=1
∆(j) >
N∑
j=n+1
∆(j),
because ∆(n) = 0 for n < n ≤ n. This is equivalent to Rq
IL
(B) > CRq
AL
(B) and
implies that B is the unique RSS-R state by Corollary 1. The argument for A is
analogous. If both A and B maximize the potential, i.e.,
∑N
j=1∆(j) = 0, Corollary
1 is not applicable. From the above arguments about supermodularity it is still true
that minimal waste revision trees (Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer, 2010) can be constructed
using singleton revising sets only, so the stochastically stable states for any regular
revision process must be the potential maximizers as for asynchronous learning.
The selection of potential maximizers in exact potential games (Blume, 1993, 1997)
has been shown to be knife-edge by Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), in the sense that it
neither holds for general revision processes beyond asynchronous learning even for exact
potential games, nor for generalized potential games even for asynchronous learning.15
Theorem 1 shows that potential maximizers do become a robust prediction for the
particular class of supermodular symmetric binary action games. Hence, the relevance
of potential maximizers does extend beyond asynchronous learning, at the price of
considering a smaller class of games. The above mentioned selection of the Pareto
efficient equilibrium in the unanimity game is robust by its supermodularity property.
The result that the risk-dominant equilibrium of a symmetric 2× 2 coordination game
played in a round-robin tournament or on a (weighted) network (Young, 1998b) will
be selected by the logit dynamics is also robust due to supermodularity. The same
is true for the results that Maruta (2002) obtains for binary coordination and hence
supermodular games under asynchronous logit response.
Theorem 1 has a straightforward intuition. With a logit choice rule, the likelihood
of a player choosing a non-best-reply is decreasing in the size of the associated payoff
loss. In supermodular games, this payoff loss becomes smaller the more players have
already switched to the non-optimal action. Hence a mistake becomes more likely the
more players have already made that mistake before. The minimal resistance paths
between absorbing states that are relevant for stochastic stability are therefore con-
structed by letting players switch sequentially as under asynchronous learning, so that
the stochastically stable states under asynchronous learning are stochastically stable
15Interestingly, however, Okada and Tercieux (2008) show that, under supermodularity, the asyn-
chronous version of the logit-response dynamics selects local potential maximizers, a generalization of
potential maximizers. Marden and Shamma (2012) describe different ways to restore the selection of
potential maximizers for more general revision processes, including updating probabilities that depend
on the level of noise and restrictions on actions sets or information available to the players. Marden
and Shamma (2012) and Candogan, Ozdaglar, and Parrilo (2013) also investigate games that are
approximately potential games.
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for any regular revision process. The team project game is not supermodular. The
mistake of leaving a successful project becomes (myopically) more expensive and hence
less likely under logit choice the more players have already made that mistake before,
because the project benefit is then shared among a smaller number of people. With
independent learning, for instance, minimal resistance paths between the absorbing
states are constructed by letting players switch simultaneously. Hence the selection
result of logit-response in the team project game will depend on the revision process,
and an RSS-R state does not generally exist. This illustrates that Theorem 1 cannot
be generalized from supermodular games to the broader class of games with strategic
complements.
4.3 Mistakes Model
In this section, we apply the myopic best-response based mistakes model. We proceed
in parallel to the previous section and first investigate robustness with respect to
revision processes, given random tie-breaking.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a symmetric binary action game with strategic complementarity.
Consider the profile of random tie-breaking best-reply rules and the mistakes model.
Then, the following states are the unique RSS-R states:
A if and only if n+ n ≤ N, B if and only if n+ n ≥ N.
Proof. Let Γ be a symmetric binary action game with strategic complementarity, with
critical values n > 0 and n < N . We will rely on Corollary 1 and radius-coradius
from Ellison (2000). The coradius is monotone by Proposition 2. For any q ∈ Q, the
unperturbed myopic best-reply dynamics with random tie-breaking has two absorbing
sets, the singletons {A} and {B}. Hence the radius is monotone for both absorbing
states, by Proposition 3.
Consider asynchronous learning. Since ∆(n) < 0 if and only if n ≤ n and ∆(n) > 0
if and only of n > n, by strategic complementarity, switching from B to A in the
presence of n − 1 other A-players is a mistake if and only if n ≤ n. Analogously,
switching to B is a mistake for any of the n A-players if and only if n > n. Fix any
s′ 6= B. Construct a minimal cost path P = (s′, ...,B) by letting A-players switch to
B sequentially. The cost of this path is C(P ) = max{m(s′) − n, 0}. It is maximal if
s′ = A so that m(s′) = N , which yields
CRq
AL
(B) = N − n,
and, from analogous arguments,
CRq
AL
(A) = n.
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Consider independent learning. By the previous arguments, at least n mistakes are
necessary to enable a transition from B to A, for any regular revision process. With
random tie-breaking, states withm(s) ≥ n can be connected toA without mistakes (by
letting indifferent B-players switch to A until A becomes a best response). Together
with the analogous arguments for A, this implies
Rq
IL
(B) = n, Rq
IL
(A) = N − n.
Now suppose n + n > N . This is identical to Rq
IL
(B) > CRq
AL
(B) and implies
that B is the unique RSS-R state by Corollary 1. The same applies to A if n+n < N .
If n + n = N , Corollary 1 is not applicable. The above arguments, however, imply
that in this case both (and only) A and B have minimal stochastic potential (Kandori
and Rob, 1995) for any regular revision process, so that they are the unique RSS-R
states.
Compared to the logit-response dynamics, the mistakes model requires only the
weaker property of strategic complementarity for robustness of its selection result in
symmetric binary action games. In this sense, the mistakes model is more robust than
the logit-response dynamics. The reason is, of course, that it makes use of the payoff
structure of the game to a lesser extent. Strategic complementarity implies that the
basin of attraction of each monomorphic state contains in its interior no area where
the unperturbed dynamics would lead away from the monomorphic state, and thus it
suffices to compare the size of the basins, irrespective of the specific regular revision
process. If a basin encompassed an area from which the unperturbed dynamics no
longer gravitates back to the absorbing state, then a simultaneous strategy change
by several players might allow for cost-saving jumps away from the absorbing state,
generating a dependence of the selection result on the revision process. This illustrates
the role of strategic complementarity for Theorem 2.
For the team project game, where n = N − nB + 1 and n = nA − 1, Theorem 2
implies that the project with smaller participation requirement is RSS-R, i.e., A if and
only if nA ≤ nB and B if and only if nB ≤ nA.
16 As another immediate application,
we again obtain the robustness of the selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium of a
symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game played in a round-robin tournament. Similarly,
the comparable results of Maruta and Okada (2009) for the symmetric case are robust
due to strategic complementarity of their binary coordination games.
Since the mistakes model is a noise process that respects tie-breaking, we can
additionally investigate robustness with respect to tie-breaking assumptions.
16Specifically, both projects are stochastically stable in the unanimity game, as already pointed
out by Young (1998a). See Maruta and Okada (2009) for a treatment of generalized, asymmetric
unanimity games under perturbed adaptive play as in Young (1993).
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Proposition 4. Let Γ be a symmetric binary action game with strategic complementar-
ity. Consider the profile of best-reply correspondences and the mistakes model. Then,
the following states are the unique RSS-RT states:
A if n < N/2, B if n > N/2.
Proof. We will rely on Corollary 2 together with Remark 1 (as a substitute for mono-
tonicity of the radius). Observe that {A} and {B} are absorbing sets of any unper-
turbed myopic best-reply dynamics (B, q) ∈ T × Q (albeit not necessarily the only
ones). From the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2, we have RB,q(B) ≥ n for any
(B, q) ∈ T × Q. With random tie-breaking and independent learning, states with
m(s) ≥ n can again be connected to A without mistakes. Hence we have
RB,q(B) ≥ RB
X ,qIL(B) = n, ∀(B, q) ∈ T ×Q,
and, from analogous arguments,
RB,q(A) ≥ RB
X ,qIL(A) = N − n, ∀(B, q) ∈ T ×Q.
Consider cautious tie-breaking and asynchronous learning. Fix any s′ 6= B. Con-
struct a minimal cost path P = (s′, ...,B) by letting A-players switch to B sequentially.
The cost of this path is C(P ) = max{m(s′)−n, 0}, because the switch of an indifferent
A-player to B is a mistake with cautious tie-breaking. It is maximal for s′ = A, which
yields
CRB
0,qAL(B) = N − n,
and, from analogous arguments,
CRB
0,qAL(A) = n.
The statement of the proposition now follows immediately from Corollary 2.
Observe that our approach delivers only sufficient conditions for RSS-RT, hence we
cannot conclude that there are no RSS-RT states if the conditions in the proposition
are not satisfied. It shares this limitation with the older radius-coradius results.17
The relatively strict conditions in Proposition 4 arise because the absorbing sets of
the unperturbed dynamics depend on tie-breaking assumptions. With random tie-
breaking, only the monomorphic states are absorbing, as both are reached with positive
probability from any state s with n ≤ m(s) ≤ n after indifferent players change their
strategy. With cautious tie-breaking, states with n < m(s) < n become absorbing as
17We were able to state necessary and sufficient conditions for RSS-R in Theorem 2, because there
our radius-coradius approach was always able to identify the unique stable state (except for the case
where both monomorphic states are stable, for which a direct argument was made in the proof).
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well, as no indifferent player will switch. More complicated non-singleton absorbing
sets emerge for intermediate tie-breaking assumptions, such as when some players
break ties cautiously and others randomly. Our approach requires to calculate the
radius for the quickest/swiftest and the coradius for the least quick/swift dynamics,
giving rise to a relatively small radius and relatively large coradius, and hence the
sufficient conditions in Proposition 4.
5 Symmetric Games and Globally Stable ESS
Consider a symmetric game Γ as defined earlier. Relevant examples include Cournot
oligopolies, rent-seeking games, and other classes of games (see Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania,
2005 for details). Following Schaffer (1988, 1989), a strategy s∗ ∈ S0 is a strict globally
stable ESS (where ESS stands for evolutionarily stable strategy) if for all s′ ∈ S0,
s′ 6= s∗,
u(s∗|s′, m. . ., s′, s∗, . . . , s∗) > u(s′|s′,m−1. . . , s′, s∗, . . . , s∗) (9)
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} . In words, s∗ earns larger payoffs than any alternative
strategy in any profile where only those two strategies are present.
In Cournot oligopolies, the Walrasian quantity has been shown by Vega-Redondo
(1997) to be a strict globally stable ESS, and stochastically stable in imitation-based
dynamics with mistakes. Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania (2005) extended this result, showing
that any strict globally stable ESS in any symmetric game is stochastically stable
in a mistakes dynamics with imitate-the-best and independent inertia (see also Alo´s-
Ferrer and Schlag, 2009). Bergin and Bernhardt (2004) provide further results for
convergence of imitative dynamics to “relative equilibria” (a closely related concept)
in general games. Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania (2005) also generalize Vega-Redondo (1997)
to show that strict global stability includes a family of outcomes of special interest
(see also Bergin and Bernhardt, 2004 for related results). Informally, an aggregative
game is a symmetric game such that players’ payoffs depend only on the own strategy
and an aggregate of all strategies. If the own strategy and the aggregate exhibit an
ordinal substitutability (quasisubmodularity), as is the case e.g. in Cournot oligopolies
and rent-seeking games, strict global stability follows from a more economic concept,
aggregate-taking-strategy, i.e., a generalization of Walrasian equilibrium where each
player maximizes payoffs taking the aggregate of all strategies as given.
For any unperturbed imitate-the-best dynamics, the singletons of monomorphic
states (s, . . . , s) are absorbing. Consider the dynamics with random tie-breaking and
independent learning. If one mutant appears at state (s∗, . . . , s∗), inequality (9) with
m = 1 indicates that s∗-players earn strictly more than the mutant. Hence, one muta-
tion is not enough to move from (s∗, . . . , s∗) to a different absorbing set. We conclude
that RB
X ,qIL(s∗, . . . , s∗) > 1. Consider now the dynamics with asynchronous learn-
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ing and cautious tie-breaking. For any monomorphic state (s, . . . , s) with s 6= s∗, if
a single mutation to s∗ occurs, by inequality (9) with m = N − 1, we obtain that
the mutant earns strictly more than the incumbents, and hence eventually an incum-
bent will be selected and switch to s∗. By (9) with m = N − 2, the next incumbent
to be selected will also switch to s∗. Iterating, the dynamics will reach the state
(s∗, . . . , s∗). We might thus be tempted to conclude that CRB
0,qAL(s∗, . . . , s∗) = 1,
and, by virtue of Corollary 2, that (s∗, . . . , s∗) is an RSS-RT state. This tempting con-
clusion, however, is incorrect. The problem is that, with the specified behavioral rule,
both asynchronous learning and cautious tie-breaking create additional absorbing sets
which do not correspond to monomorphic states, and the above coradius computation
fails. The following example shows a failure of robustness with respect to tie-breaking
assumptions, showing that a strict globally stable ESS needs not be RSS-RT.
Example 3. Let N be even, N ≥ 6, and consider a symmetric game with strategies
S0 = {A,B,C}. Let m
A(s) be the number of players choosing A and piA(s) the
payoff of an A-player in profile s, and analogously for B and C. Hence we can write
ui(si, s−i) = pi
si(si, s−i). Let C(s) ⊆ S0 be the set of strategies actually played in s.
Payoffs are either 1 (win) or 0 (lose) and given as follows. First, piA(A) = piB(B) =
piC(C) = 1. Second, piA(s) = 1 and piB(s) = 0 whenever C(s) = {A,B}, and piA(s) = 1
and piC(s) = 0 whenever C(s) = {A,C}. Third, piA(s) = 0 and piB(s) = piC(s) = 1
whenever C(s) = {A,B,C}. Last, whenever C(s) = {B,C}, piB(s) = 1 if mB(s) ≤
mC(s) and piB(s) = 0 otherwise, and symmetrically for C, i.e., in this case the weak
minority wins. Note that A is a strict globally stable ESS of this game.
Now consider imitate-the-best with cautious tie-breaking and asynchronous learn-
ing. Analyze the dynamics on the reduced state space where states with the same
number of players for each strategy are identified. There are four absorbing sets, all
of them singletons. They correspond to the three monomorphic states plus the state
sˆ with equal number of B- and C-players, and no A-player. A single mutation to B
suffices for a transition from C to sˆ and symmetrically for B, and two mutations (one
to B, one to C) suffice for a transition from A to sˆ. Hence CRB
0,qAL(sˆ) = 2. However,
at least N/2 ≥ 3 mutations are needed to leave sˆ for a different absorbing set, so
RB
0,qAL(sˆ) > CRB
0,qAL(sˆ) and it follows that sˆ is the only stochastically stable state.
The last example relies crucially on the combination of cautious tie-breaking (which
renders sˆ absorbing) and asynchronous learning (which implies that more than one
mutation is necessary to destabilize sˆ). It raises the natural question of whether a
strict globally stable ESS would at least be RSS-R if one maintains the assumption
of random tie-breaking. The answer is negative. The next example shows a failure of
robustness with respect to revision opportunities.
Example 4. Let N be even, N ≥ 8, and consider a symmetric game with strategies
S0 = {A,B,C}. Let the notation be as in the previous example. Payoffs are as follows.
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First, piA(A) = piB(B) = piC(C) = 1. Second, piA(s) = 1 and piB(s) = 0 whenever
C(s) = {A,B}, and piA(s) = 1 and piC(s) = 0 whenever C(s) = {A,C}. Third,
whenever C(s) = {A,B,C} or C(s) = {B,C}, piA(s) = 0 (if A ∈ C(s)), piB(s) = 1
if mB(s) ≤ mC(s) and piB(s) = 0 otherwise, and symmetrically for C, i.e., the weak
minority between B and C wins even if A is present. Again, A is a strict globally
stable ESS of this game.
Now consider imitate-the-best with random tie-breaking and asynchronous learn-
ing. It is easy to see that there is a non-singleton absorbing set S′ = {s=, s−, s+},
with mB(s=) = m
C(s=) = N/2, m
B(s+) = m
C(s−) = (N/2) + 1, and m
B(s−) =
mC(s+) = (N/2) − 1. The unperturbed dynamics transitions into S
′ from all states
with C(s) = {A,B,C} or C(s) = {B,C}. A single mutation suffices to reach one of
these states from B, C, and any state with C(s) = {A,B} or C(s) = {A,C}. It takes
two mutations to reach one of these states from A. To leave S′ for a different absorbing
set, at least (N/2)− 1 ≥ 3 mutations are necessary. It follows that the states in S′ are
the only stochastically stable states.
The examples above are, admittedly, rather extreme. They give, however, an ex-
ample of a well-established stochastic stability result which fails the robustness test(s).
This robustness failure arises from a conceptual problem with the definition of finite-
population ESS. That definition is based on payoff differences between mutant and
incumbents when only two strategies are present, which allows wild specifications of
payoffs when more than two strategies are part of the strategy profile. A concept
based on pairwise comparisons, while yielding stochastic stability for a reasonable set
of dynamics, can be “tricked” by exploiting the freedom of specification left by the
concept when more than two strategies are present. This kind of problem is precisely
what our robustness test was meant to identify.
6 Conclusion
Stochastic stability is and remains an important concept in game theory. In our view,
it is well suited to analyze questions of outcome selection in noisy environments, as
long as the different ingredients of the model are clearly differentiated. Ideally, a
strong, clear-cut result is one linking a particular behavioral assumption (captured
by a behavioral rule or correspondence) under a particular interaction structure (as a
proxy for the socioeconomic setting, e.g. the network structure) to the selection of a
particular outcome. Failing that, it is still important to understand how more subtle
elements of the model have an influence on long-run outcomes. Our concept of robust
stochastic stability aims to differentiate clear-cut predictions from more subtle ones.
For noisy behavioral rules where specific tie-breaking assumptions are built into the
rule, as in the case of logit choice, robust stochastic stability requires robustness with
respect to the specification of revision opportunities. For noisy rules which remain
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silent (or are less vocal) on the issue of tie-breaking, as in the case of the mistakes
model, robustness also includes the latter.
We have provided an easy-to-use sufficient condition for robust stochastic stability,
and have illustrated its application for different games and dynamics. The condition
makes use of an order structure of the space of dynamics, by observing that the radius
and coradius concepts introduced in the literature are typically monotone operators in
this space. Our result itself reduces to a radius-coradius approach, with the difference
that the radius is taken with respect to the “quickest” dynamics (independent learning
and random tie-breaking) and the coradius is taken with respect to the “slowest” one
(asynchronous learning and cautious tie-breaking). Hence in the quest to obtain results
which are independent of certain parts of the specification of the dynamics, we are led
to concentrate on two particular, extreme dynamics.
In our illustrations, we have focused on two important classes of behavioral rules,
myopic best reply and imitate-the-best. Our results can of course be applied to other
rules. For instance, suppose once wishes to consider robustness within the class of
rules that focus on strategies delivering better payoffs than the current one, either in
a forward-looking sense (“better-reply dynamics”, as in e.g. Friedman and Mezzetti,
2001) or in an observational sense (“imitate if better”, as in e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg,
1995). If one defines the behavioral correspondence in the natural way, the question
reduces to robustness with respect to tie-breaking rules within the class of behavioral
rules agreeing with that correspondence.
We conclude by emphasizing that working with radius and coradius of two different
dynamics is not the same as establishing stochastic stability for these two dynamics,
i.e., as checking conventional radius-coradius conditions for the two. Robustness is
stronger, as it requires stochastic stability also for all intermediate (balanced and
regular) dynamics. The following logit-response based example shows that a state
can be stochastically stable for both independent and asynchronous learning, but fail
to be stochastically stable for all regular revision processes. Consider a symmetric
binary action game with N = 7 and a difference function ∆(n) as depicted in Figure
3. If learning is asynchronous and −[∆(1) + ∆(2) + ∆(3)] < [∆(5) + ∆(6) + ∆(7)],
then A is stochastically stable because the utility losses of moving from A to B are
strictly larger than those of moving from B to A. If learning is independent and
−∆(1) < ∆(7), then the same is true because optimal transitions between A and B
involve simultaneous strategy changes by 3 players, generating minimal utility losses of
3∆(7) and −3∆(1), respectively. Now consider a regular revision process q ∈ Q where
q{1,2} > 0 and qJ = 0 for all other J ⊆ I with |J | ≥ 2. Under the assumption that
−∆(2) < −[∆(1) + ∆(3)]/2, a minimal utility loss transition from B to A involves
a single player switching to A first, followed by a simultaneous switch of players 1
and 2. The associated utility losses are −[∆(1) + 2∆(2)]. An analogous argument
shows that moving from A to B generates minimal utility losses of [∆(7) + 2∆(6)] if
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Figure 3: Non-Robustness
∆(6) < [∆(5) +∆(7)]/2. Now consider a game where
∆(1) = −1,∆(2) = −10,∆(3) = −20,∆(5) = 20,∆(6) = 7,∆(7) = 5.
These parameters satisfy all above assumptions, and they imply thatB is stochastically
stable under q because −[∆(1) + 2∆(2)] > [∆(7) + 2∆(6)].
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